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grEEning thE sPhErE:  
towArds An ECo-EthiCs  
for thE LoCAL And ArtifiCiAL
grEgErs AndErsEn
Today we can build space stations about two-hundred kilometers above 
the earth and so we already have a strong impression of operating in an 
anti-world milieu.  Everything human beings need up there they have to 
take along with them, including the air they want to breathe.... This life-
in-capsules has something trend-setting about it.  In my view, the third 
millennium will be the world age of atmotechnics and of integral container 
technology.  The space station is a key metaphor for the social architecture 
of the coming world age.  
—Peter Sloterdijk and Hans-Jürgen Heinrichs (2007, 214)
In our time of climatic crisis, this dark vision formulated by the German 
philosopher Peter Sloterdijk to Hans-Jürgen Heinrichs in the conversation 
book Die Sonne und der Tod (Neither Sun nor Death) (2007) has an even 
more sinister ring than when formulated a decade ago.  As the conditions 
for human existence deteriorate in numerous places on the planet due to 
anthropogenic climate change, the anti-world milieu that Sloterdijk talks about 
is, with increasing pace, becoming world.  One could even say that one of 
the main psychological consequences of anthropogenic climate change is the 
meeting with what in German goes by the name of das Unheimliche, or the 
uncanny experience of the familiar becoming strange.1  On the other hand, 
the age of atmotechnics is already here and has been for some time.  From 
the supermarket to the apartment, from the airport to the car, air is artificially 
produced to create a pleasant climate indoors.  This production is so ordinary 
that we as consumers of air may easily forget that air-conditioning and the 
technological tempering of climate provide us with protection and comfort 
in an environment we might otherwise experience as hostile.  Sloterdijk is, of 
course, well aware of this, as he has even devoted a trilogy of more than 2600 
1This term can, with different theoretical implications, for example, be found in the works 
of Freud and Heidegger.  See Freud (2003, 148) and Heidegger (1977, 250).
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pages to philosophical analysis of integral container technology or of spheres 
(Sphären).  
In this essay, I will use Sloterdijk’s analysis to outline an environmental 
ethics that I place between two other eco-ethics: on the one hand, the local 
eco-ethics that can be found in Heidegger’s philosophy, and, on the other 
hand, a global eco-ethics proposed by Timothy Morton—though Morton’s 
ethics will be presented in less detail than those of Heidegger.  The aim is to 
show that Sloterdijk’s conceptualization of the sphere can facilitate a much-
needed shift in ecocriticism by turning the ecocritical imagination towards 
a space that it has until now neglected: the space of the local and artificial. 
Being either consistent with the advocacy for the shepherding of local nature 
that was strongly voiced in literary (eco)criticism from the early 1960s on 
to the late 1990s, or with the advocacies for a more global eco-ethics that 
have followed, the local and artificial has virtually been left unnoticed by 
ecocriticism (Heise 2008, 10).  It seems simply to have fallen into an abyss 
between these two ways of imagining environmental engagement.
The current climate crisis makes it clear that ecocriticism can no longer 
afford to ignore the fact that all over the world more and more people 
are dwelling in a local environment that is highly artificial.  As more and 
more people live in an urban climate, where they only experience nature as 
pastiche, an imaginative approach to environmental engagement is needed 
that takes its starting point in the place where people are actually located. 
For the majority of people who emit the most greenhouse gasses, this place 
is some kind of air-conditioned capsule, which is Sloterdijk’s favorite term 
for the modern apartment.  Even though such an approach may instantly 
appear to apply only to the Western world or even be accused of inheriting 
a latent Eurocentrism in Sloterdijk’s thought, this is not the case.  One must 
remember that the rise of the megacity is not only equivalent to the rise of the 
planet of slums, as suggested by the American urban theorist Mike Davis, but 
also implies an increasing “apartmentalization” (2007, 4).  
Thus, it is time to consider ecocriticism from the perspective of 
atmotechnics.  To substantiate what this actually means, let me here take 
Sloterdijk’s critique of his self-proclaimed mentor Heidegger as a starting 
point.  In an interview with the German magazine Archplus in 2004, Sloterdijk 
described his trilogy on spheres as an attempt “to criticize Heidegger with 
Heidegger” (mit Heidegger gegen Heidegger) (Sloterdijk, Kraft, and Kuhnert 
2004; 23) and made the following remark:  
Heidegger, who we must regard as the last great thinker of rural 
life, thought of existential time as waiting time and because of that 
as boredom.  The event that this waiting was grounded in was 
something both natural and mysterious: that the things on the 
fields of Being matured.  The philosopher equated the field with 
world history without recognizing that the worlds of the cities no 
longer were “field-like.”  In the city things do not mature.  They are 
produced.  
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(Heidegger, den ich in diesem Zusammenhang als den letzten wirklichen 
Denker des bäuerlichen Lebens sehen möchte, begreift die existenti-
elle Zeit weiterhin als Wartezeit und daher auch als Langeweile.  Das 
Ereignis, auf das dieses Warten hinführt, ist naturgemäß etwas abgrün-
dig Einfaches: daß die Dinge auf dem Acker des Werdens reif werden. 
 
Der Philosoph setzt diesen Acker mit der Weltgeschichte gleich, ohne 
zu bedenken, daß die Welt der Städte nicht mehr ackerförmig sein kann.  
In der Stadt reifen die Dinge nicht, sie werden produziert.) (Sloterdijk, 
Kraft, and Kuhnert 2004; 20)2  
It seems to me that Sloterdijk here makes a strong argument against the 
advocacy for the shepherding of local nature and its—in an ecocritical 
sense—avant-garde thinker.  What is lacking most profoundly in Heidegger’s 
thinking, in light of the evolving climate crisis, is an attempt to imagine how 
urban experience in a positive sense converts the imperative to shepherd.  In 
a millennium where the majority of the people on the planet no longer live 
in the countryside, it is not plausible to deposit one’s hope for a sustainable 
future in an imperative that calls for a shepherding of agrarian fields and 
woods.  Thus, the Heideggerian way of thinking caring for nature as “setting 
it forth” (her-vor-bringen) in accordance with the rhythm of the seasons, and 
otherwise “letting it be” (gelassen) does not mark a way forward in the age of 
anthropogenic climate change (Heidegger 2000, 13).  However, according to 
Sloterdijk, this does not mean that we must depart from Heidegger’s thought 
entirely.  On the contrary, what can be learned by looking at life in cities all 
over the planet is that Heidegger’s understanding of “Dasein” as “Being-in-
the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein) still forms a fruitful perspective in the quest to 
understand human existence (Sloterdijk 2004, 79-80).  What modern urban 
architecture explicates is that technological air-conditioning supports the 
round world that encircles the subject today and that human existence should 
therefore be thought as In-Sphären-Sein, or as “life in a sphere” (Sloterdijk 
1999, 46).
In a more detailed philosophical reading, this means that the round 
“shelter” (Unterkunft) or protecting “region” (Gegend) that Heidegger 
described in his works from the mid-1930s onwards, especially in Gelassenheit 
(1959), as a result of meditating and dwelling in nature is, to Sloterdijk, 
something that humans create themselves (Heidegger 1960, 40).  When 
Sloterdijk criticizes Heidegger in Archplus for thinking of existential time as 
waiting time, it is because he cannot accept Heidegger’s description of the 
human as the “ecstatic clearing” (Lichtung) that waits to set forth “the being 
of beings” (des Seins das Seiende) in a region sheltered by nature (Heidegger 
1976, 330).  In the urban worlds of atmotechnics, shelters are produced, 
2This interview appeared as the editorial, “Architekten machen nichts anderes als In-
Theorie” (“Architects Do Everything but Theory”) in a special issue of Archplus entitled 
Architekturen des Schaums (“Architecture of the Foam”).  All translations from Sloterdijk, apart 
from Neither Sun nor Death, are mine.  
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and therefore the ecstatic moment is, according to Sloterdijk, a moment of 
self-creation (autogeneses) of immunity, which is the term Sloterdijk uses to 
describe the feeling of protection inside the sphere.  Thus, Sloterdijk, in his 
introduction to Sphären, defines spheres as “spaces created by ecstatic beings 
that seek immunity from an outside” (Sphären sind immunsystemisch wirksame 
Raumschöpfungen für ekstatische Wesen, an denen da Außen arbeitet) (1999a, 28). 
In the first two volumes of Sphären, titled Blasen (Bubbles) and Globen 
(Globes), Sloterdijk explores the protection or immunity provided by religion. 
However, his focus shifts to the immunity provided by technological 
air-conditioning in the third volume, titled Schäume (Foam).  This shift from 
religion to air-conditioning may seem odd, but Sloterdijk uses it to make an 
important point.  The point is as follows: after the death of God—a moment 
that Sloterdijk links to the proclamation by Nietzsche—it has been clear 
that the human subject is “thrown” (geworfen) into a world without any 
metaphysical protection and is therefore in principle without protection 
or is on the outside of protection (1999b, 591).  In the modern world, the 
ecstasy of human beings is therefore, according to Sloterdijk, connected 
to the production of immunity through integral container technology and 
air-conditioning, since this technological encasement restores a feeling of 
protection and safety related to the mother and life in the womb (1999a, 62).  
In other words, we here return to Sloterdijk’s description of modern 
existence as In-Sphären-Sein.  However, what Sloterdijk is really interested 
in describing in his analysis in Schäume is the sociality of modern urban 
societies.  To Sloterdijk, foam is the word that best describes the sociality of 
these societies, since they are mostly made up of a gathering of air-conditioned 
capsules (apartments, offices, stores etc.), wherein residents and users only 
share a minimal feeling of connectedness, even though their capsules are 
clustered together like bubbles of foam.  The social contract between the 
residents and users of these capsules can thus be summed up, Sloterdijk 
argues, as an agreement to promote a general immunity that ensures that 
the individuals living and using the capsules can realize themselves in the 
utmost way (1999a, 137).  
Now, if one agrees with this description of modern urban society (as I 
tend to), foam becomes the condition from which various solutions to the 
crisis caused by anthropogenic climate change must be imagined.  This also 
means that ecocriticism should take neoliberal capitalism as its imaginative 
starting point, since neoliberal capitalism is the political and economic frame 
of foam.  Or, in more simple terms: since foam is where most of us seem to be 
not only in a spatial sense, but also in a psychological sense, a change towards 
a more green modernity—and what the British sociologist John Urry recently 
dubbed “resource capitalism” (2011, 118-119)—must be critically imagined as 
a change of neoliberal capitalist culture from within.  To those, such as Slavoj 
Žižek, who regard capitalism itself as the real problem behind the “pseudo-
problem” (2010, 334) of anthropogenic climate change, this will hardly sound 
convincing.  However, by not imagining a communistic end to anthropogenic 
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climate change or using critical theory to imagine a radical reformation of 
the political and economic system, I do think Sloterdijk’s description of foam 
marks out a more pragmatic arena for the critical imagination.  
In fact, what I think critical imagination should imply in our time of 
climate crisis is very banal, in the sense of the word that the British social 
scientist Michal Billig has used in his research on nationalism.  Banal, in 
this case, does not mean easy at all.  Instead, it means the promotion of new 
practices of everyday life by invoking a new set of socially shared imaginaries 
through popular culture and the mass media (Billig 2002, 6).  Ecocriticism can 
help facilitate such a critical reimagining of the socially shared imaginaries of 
neoliberal capitalist culture, but I do not think it is an imaginative task that 
ecocriticism can manage on its own.  Creators of commercials, journalists, 
and others who have a creative platform on the Internet, television or through 
other popular cultural products play a vital role in this regard.  For example 
(as it is also about how language is used), journalists should stop referring 
to oil as “the black gold,” as it is even more so the gooey stuff that we are 
destroying our planet with.  New practices need new storytelling, and the 
story of a good life through sustainability needs to be retold over and over 
again if the banal practices of everyday life are to change.  
One practice which in this regard certainly needs to be imagined anew is 
the relation we as inhabitants of foam have to our local air-conditioned space 
and technological capsules.  As there is an increasing probability that the 
space station will be a “key metaphor for the social architecture of the coming 
world age,” as Sloterdijk is visioning, some eco-ethical rules for the spheres 
of the future need to be imagined.  However, this rather grim vision of a 
future in which life all over the planet needs technological air-conditioning as 
its support system does not mean that we shall suspend our engagement and 
wait for such a future.  An eco-ethics for spheres should imply more than that. 
Thus, the first imperative of the eco-ethics I am proposing implies a greening 
of local spheres through insulation and a more energy effective caretaking 
of our households.  As one of the major challenges of anthropogenic climate 
change is to provide enough energy through sustainable energy sources, 
increasing the effectiveness of our energy use will be an important step in 
ensuring a sustainable future for both humans and animals.  Let us start with 
our local apartments, cars and other owned life-containers, and from there 
we can expand our greening to the airports, offices and commercial centers 
that the French anthropologist Marc Augé has termed non-places (1995, 34).  
On an individual level, this means a turn towards a more disciplined 
and caring lifestyle.  In the age of atmotechnics, we must accept that it is 
by greening our artificial air-conditioned surroundings that we contribute 
to a positive change in our common climate.  Again, Sloterdijk provides our 
imaginations with the philosophical details that can make such a change 
possible.  In one of his most recent books, Du mußt dein Leben ändern.  Über 
Anthropoteknik (“You must change your life: On anthropotechnique”) (2009), 
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Sloterdijk formulates what could be viewed as a new imperative for the soci-
eties of foam.  Defining the term co-immunity (Ko-immunismus), he writes:
Co-immunity means civilization and the rules of this civilization 
are now or never to be understood.  These rules code the 
anthropotechnique in such a way that individual existence fits 
into the context of all contexts.  The subject, who wants to live 
under the immunity of civilization, must now take the decision 
to turn all practices into the good habit of common survival.   
 
(Eine solche Struktur heißt Zivilisation.  Ihre Ordensregeln sind jetzt 
oder nie zu verfassen.  Sie werden die Anthropotechniken codieren, die 
der Existenz im Kontext aller Kontexte gemäß sind.  Unter ihnen leben zu 
wollen würde den Entschluß bedeuten: in täglichen Übungen die guten 
Gewohnheiten gemeinsamen Überlebens anzunehmen.) (2009, 713-714) 
“The context of all contexts” here means our common atmosphere presiding 
over our local spheres.  However, when Sloterdijk describes how we, as 
residents of spheres, must now turn our everyday practices “into the good 
habit of common survival” by making our bubbles of foam fit into their 
atmospheric context, it gets more complicated.  The reason is that Sloterdijk 
here is playing on the double meaning of the German word Übung.  This 
word means “practice,” as I have translated it above, but (like “practice” in 
English) it also means “training.” Thus, what Sloterdijk is trying to underpin 
in Du mußt dein Leben ändern.  Über Anthropoteknik is that our everyday life is 
already full of practices, where we in various ways use training in order to 
avoid risk and decrease the probability of acute death (2009, 23).  One example 
of this, which Sloterdijk also refers to, is fitness-training (2009, 691).  This 
popular phenomenon, which is often regarded as a narcissistic occupation 
with the fetish of the body, also contains an element of extreme discipline and 
self-improvement that decreases the risk of lifestyle diseases.  Detached from 
its narcissistic occupation, it is this kind of discipline that we must learn to 
use in its full potential, because it is only through daily reoccurring training 
that we will gradually become capable of reducing the energy use in our 
practices.  In this sense, we are today forced to rethink the positive effect of a 
value (discipline) scandalized by totalitarian ideologies and aesthetics.  
At the same time, I do not think it is possible to split the Da (“there”) 
and the Sein (“Being”) of the Heideggerian Dasein (“Being There”).  We 
are all in a world we more and less keep returning to and therefore have a 
special reason and imperative to care for.  To care for the atmospheric context 
means first of all to care for one’s local sphere and then from there outsource 
the caring or greening to other spheres.  When I go to the airport or the 
supermarket, there are certain limits to my possibility to green.  I cannot, 
as Morton makes it clear in The Ecological Thought (2010a, 22), envision the 
whole systems of transactions I take part in.  But, in opposition to Morton 
(28), I do not think this lack of a panoptic vision enables me to step into an 
             Gregers Andersen      Greening the Sphere
symplokeˉ    143
even bigger world, where I—exactly because I cannot envision the whole, but 
only my place in a larger interconnectedness (mesh)—can identify myself with 
every strange creature and thing on the planet.  Where the ecological thought, 
according to Morton, says: “Give us nowhere to stand, and we shall care for 
the Earth” (24), I propose we reply with Sloterdijk in mind: “No, let us start 
by looking out for our local spheres.” What Morton, along with many others 
advocating a global eco-ethics, eco-cosmopolitanism or a planetary sense of 
belonging, seems to forget or neglect here is the social contract of foam or the 
egocentric attachment to the local sphere.  What Sloterdijk is applying with 
his description of co-immunity as a fitting of the individual context into the 
context of all contexts is exactly that human beings cannot be wrestled out of 
their attachment to certain spheres.  This attachment is simply part of their 
ontological status as ecstatic beings that seek immunity from an outside.  
However, this should not lead us down the political path Heidegger 
took.  Literary science fiction is already filled with visions of neo-fascist 
bubble-communities, who live under an immunity their lifestyles are leading 
others to lose.3  Thus, to be attached to one’s local sphere and being its green 
caretaker does not mean accepting the injustice of a global economy that 
leaves those that are currently excluded from the immunity of spheres outside 
to suffer without any rights.  What solidarity should mean in a forthcoming 
era of atmotechnics is, as Sloterdijk has formulated it in Die Sonne und der Tod, 
“to conceive finitude and opening simultaneously” (2007, 189-190).  
This rather ambiguous formulation points to a middle road between 
the too small world marked out by Heidegger’s phenomenology and the too 
large world marked out in Morton’s ethics.  We cannot be honest to ourselves 
without conceptualizing some kind of cynical finitude to our spheres.  The 
strange stranger, which is Morton’s term for the uncanny Other, can also be a 
nuisance, a nuisance we in our everyday life continually refuse to deal with 
and thereby refuse the comfort of our spheres.  On the other hand, we have 
ethical, practical and all kinds of life-enriching reasons to let the uncanny 
Other into our communities of foam.  The issue at hand here is to expand the 
co-immunity of the societies of foam to such a degree that it can include all 
beings without breaking down the walls of the individual’s spheres.  This also 
means that the role of politics in the future will be to produce atmospheric 
solidarity or shelter for all creatures.  This cannot of course be regarded as 
anything other than a very techno-optimistic and idealistic aim, but on the 
other hand the fact that we as humans are beings that create our own spheres 
should also mean that we should strive at securing co-immunity for all, or, as 
Sloterdijk has described it in Die Sonne und der Tod:  
For present-day cultures the question of survival has become a 
question of the way in which they are produced as atmospheric 
communities.  Even physical atmospheres have passed to the stage 
3See, for example, Spinrad (1999, 6-7).  
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of their technical producibility.  The future era will be climate-tech-
nical, and as such technologically oriented.  It will be increasingly 
seen that societies are artificial from the ground up.  The air that, 
together and separately, we breathe can no longer be presupposed.  
Everything must be produced technically, and the metaphorical 
atmosphere as much as the physical atmosphere.  Politics will 
become a department of climate techniques.  (2007, 245)   
My supplement to Sloterdijk’s thought is in this regard to state the somewhat 
obvious.  That is, to reaffirm the important enhancement of Kant’s categorical 
imperative suggested by the German philosopher Hans Jonas (1984, 8), so 
that it also implies an imperative to care for beings other than humans.  If 
the future means more spheres and more sheltering in air-conditioned 
containers, then it is our eco-ethical obligation to produce the technological 
communities that Sloterdijk talks about in ways that allow beings other than 
humans to thrive.  This does not mean we should leave what a majority of 
people still refer to with words such as “wildness” or “nature” to melt or dry 
out.  These words must still be dear to us, even though anthropogenic climate 
change has shown us, once and for all, that we as humans are destructively 
territorializing the whole globe to such a degree that it is no longer possible 
to speak of authentic nature or wilderness (Latour 1993, 50).  To work as an 
individual for the co-immunity or sheltering of all beings also means to work 
for the preservation of the areas known as wilderness or nature, because it 
makes the production of atmospheric solidarity for all creatures a lot easier. 
However, my call for an eco-ethics for spheres is at the same time grounded 
in the recognition that it may not be possible to save what is called nature or 
wilderness.  The training and disciplining of everyday life will take time and 
therefore an eco-ethics that attempts to look ahead is needed, in order to save 
what may otherwise be forgotten in a possibly chaotic future.  The call for 
an immediate and future greening of spheres is an attempt to imagine some 
eco-ethical rules that work against such forgetfulness.  
To green the sphere thus means to transfer an ethics of caring and 
guarding of beings on to the architectonical air-production of modern 
societies.  It is possible that this caring will mean the taming and artificial 
production of wilderness that various environmental movements often seem 
to become offended by.  However, as the British ecocritic Greg Garrard has 
made evident in his Ecocriticism (2004), hybrid constructions such as the Eden 
Project in Cornwall, which unites an artificial technosphere with the local 
ecosphere, may very well be the most effective way to secure a biodiverse 
future (181-182).  If the space station will be a “key metaphor for the social 
architecture of the coming world age,” such hybrids may be the sole and 
therefore optimal habitat for endangered ecosystems.  Thankfully, we are still 
in a position where we are not forced to acknowledge such a future.  Instead, 
the fact that we live in a more and more urban and artificial century should 
compel ecocriticism to turn its attention to the local and artificial in order to 
think in critical accordance with it.  That is, to use criticism and the creativity 
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of the imagination to give a new and sustainable meaning to the idea of living 
a good life in a consumer-oriented society.  
In this essay I have striven to outline an eco-ethics for the local and 
artificial.  The first imperative of this ethics is the greening of our local 
spheres through insulation and a more energy effective caretaking of our 
households and air-conditioned surroundings.  The second imperative is the 
eco-ethical obligation to produce the spherical communities of the future in a 
way that allows beings other than humans to thrive.  In a deeply capitalistic 
and egocentric world, it is everyday life—dominated by the imaginaries of 
popular culture—that must be critically reimagined in new and sustainable 
ways.  It is, so to speak, in the autogenic process of spherical creation that a 
critical climate for change must be placed and nurtured in order to mature. 
The fact that we are now—returning one last time to Morton—beginning to 
experience the effect of hyperobjects (in the sense that we are living on a planet 
where it is becoming more and more obvious that things are interrelated) does 
not, in this regard, mean that we do not need a place from which we can take 
action (2010b).  Even though the Heideggerian Dasein has been dressed in new 
spherical clothing, humans are still local beings.  The increasing rootlessness 
caused by globalization has not changed this in a substantial way.  So even 
though I sympathize with Morton’s ethics, I do not find it philosophically 
sustainable.  The local is still a term ecocriticism should continue to explore. 
In fact, it is in the abyss between the old Heideggerian imperative to save 
authentic, local nature, and the abstract recognition of the strange strangers 
of an artificial world, suggested by Morton, that ecocriticism should seek its 
future place for action.  
UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN
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